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Health Insurance in Ireland:
Issues and Challenges
Brian Nolan ∗
Introduction
Over the past decade or so the context in which Ireland’s complex mix of public
and private health care operates has changed radically, as the numbers purchasing
health insurance have soared and the nature of the insurance market has changed
in response to EU regulations. This has widened the divide between those with and
without health insurance, and called into question the public-private structure on
which Ireland has relied for many years. Almost half the Irish population now pay
for private health insurance, one of the highest levels of coverage in the OECD.
This is despite the fact that hospital care is what private health insurance mostly
covers, and everyone has entitlement to public hospital care from the state. The
insured can avail of “private” health care, but much of this private care is actually
delivered in public hospitals. The resulting two-tier system is now widely regarded
as problematic from an equity perspective, but there are also serious efficiency
issues arising from the incentive structures embedded in this particularly close
intertwining of public and private.
1. The Structure and Role of Health
Insurance in Ireland
For many years those towards the top of the income distribution in Ireland
have been encouraged to take out “private” health insurance. In the late 1950s
a monopoly state-backed not-for-profit health insurer – the Voluntary Health
Insurance Board (VHI) – was established to cater for the top 15% or so of the
income distribution, who did not (then) have entitlement to public hospital care
∗. The Economic and Social Research Institute. 4 Burlington Road, Dublin 4, Ireland –
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from the state. This state-backed insurer operated community rating and income
tax relief was available on premia paid. This structure was designed, inter alia,
to ensure that the entire population had access to hospital care while satisfying
the demands of medical consultants that their private practice not be undermined.
Those towards the top of the distribution were in effect encouraged to take out
“private” insurance, while the cost of in-patient care for the rest of the population
was fully covered by the state.
To complicate the picture – and it is a crucial difference between Ireland and
many other countries – not only was “private” insurance provided for many years
by what was to all intents and purposes an arm of the State, much of the “pri-
vate” care it covers was and is delivered in public hospitals. Medical consultants
retained the right to treat their private patients in public hospitals, and about half
of all private hospital care is in fact delivered in those hospitals. Most patient
receiving private care – in a public or private hospital – have insurance, and
the insurer reimburses both medical consultant and hospital. However, for many
years public hospitals only charged for the “hotel” facilities associated with being
in a private room. In addition, most medical consultants are contracted to care
for public patients in public hospitals on a salaried basis, while maintaining the
scope to treat private patients on a fee-for-service basis. We try to tease out the
implications of the complex mix of incentives involved below, but the key point
is that public and private systems in Ireland, rather than being distinct, have what
has accurately been described as a symbiotic relationship (Barrington 1987).
From the 1950s to the late 1970s or early 1980s, this public-private mix sup-
ported by “private” health insurance functioned in roughly the way it was de-
signed to do, with a monopoly insurer covering private care for the well-off and
in effect “topping off” the public system. There have been fundamental changes
in the health insurance landscape since then. The first is the dramatic rise in
the percentage of the population buying health insurance. This jumped up from
about 20 % to 30 % in the late 1970s, jumped once again in 1987 to 35 %, rose
steadily through the 1990s and by now is very close to half the population. This
occurred despite the fact that full entitlement to public hospital care (subject to
some charges levied on all those above a low income threshold) was extended to
the top part of the income distribution in the early 1990s.
Another major change is that there are now competing insurers. In response to
the EU’s 1992 Third Non-Life Insurance Directive, designed to stimulate compe-
tition in insurance, the Irish government enacted new legislation opening up the
health insurance market. As a result a second significant insurer, BUPA Ireland
(a subsidiary of the British insurer) commenced operation in 1997. However, the
way the market operates is tightly regulated: Ireland obtained approval from the
EU to continue to require all insurers to apply open enrolment, community rating
and lifetime cover, as enshrined in the 1994 Health Insurance Act and the 1996
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Health Insurance Regulations. In 2001 a Health Insurance Authority was set up
to oversee and regulate the market. Among its responsibilities is implementation
of a risk equalisation scheme in order to support community rating. This has
proved particularly controversial and no transfer of funds across insurers has yet
taken place. The VHI continues to dominate the market, with about 95% of sub-
scribers, and although its status has been debated it remains a not-for-profit body
whose board is appointed by the Minister for Health, requiring official approval
for changes in premium levels. None the less, the entry of BUPA and potential
entry of further insurers is a fundamental change in the health insurance market. 1
2. Understanding Recent Trends
and Their Implications
So health insurance in Ireland, having been the preserve of the better-off
for many years, now covers half the population. Quite why this increase in the
numbers buying health insurance has occurred is not well understood. The scale
of economic growth and increasing real household incomes in Ireland during the
1990s – the “Celtic Tiger” – has clearly made it possible for more people, but
this does not explain why they want or feel the need to have health insurance
cover. The upward trend in numbers insured has also proved remarkably resilient
in the face of significant annual premium increases and a diminution in income
tax relief as tax rates fell and relief was scaled back to the standard rather than
the purchaser’s marginal tax rate. Econometric time-series analysis also suggests
that the evolution of income and price still leave much of the increase in demand
to be explained, so it is also important to explore what people think they are
buying when they buy insurance, and the alternative they face or believe they
face without it.
Attitudinal surveys 2 suggest that concern about waiting times for public hos-
pital care is uppermost in people’s minds, that quality of care has also come to be
seen as a significant issue, and that having a private room or other “hotel” aspects
are not seen as an important reason for buying private insurance. Waiting times
for public hospitals are widely perceived to be long, both by those with and with-
out insurance. So what people essentially believe they are buying is the assurance
that they can access hospital care when they need it, without undue waiting and
with care from a medical consultant of their choice.
1. A recent OECD review of private health insurance in Ireland, in a series on this topic in a range
of countries, has a useful description of the system and discussion of some of the issues highlighted
here ((Colombo and Tapay 2004).
2. See Watson and Williams (2001), Health Insurance Authority 2003.
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It seems plausible then that perceptions of access to public hospitals combined
with perceptions of the quality of public versus private care are key drivers under-
pinning demand for health insurance. The role of media coverage in influencing
such perceptions merits examination, but there are indeed long waits for certain
types of public hospital treatment that are by-passed by those with insurance. In
one of the attitudinal surveys, for example, almost half the respondents said they
personally knew someone who recently had a lengthy wait for public hospital
treatment – so they were not simply influenced by media reports. Econometric
analysis of data from household surveys measuring utilisation also suggests that
those with insurance have a higher probability of an in-patient stay than those
without, controlling for available measures of “need”.
This two-tier hospital system is now widely regarded as problematic from
an equity perspective. Indeed, the issue of equity of access to hospital care for
public versus private patients has become a very high profile one politically, and
equity as a goal has been highlighted in the official health strategy produced after
lengthy consultation in 2001. The focus of policy has been on regulating access
to public hospitals, on the proportion of private versus public beds in them, on
the charges for private care in public hospitals, and on reducing waiting times
for public patients. As argued in the next section, though, this focus misses
some deep-seated structural problems, in respect to both equity and efficiency,
which the recent upsurge in numbers insured has not created but has certainly
exacerbated.
3. Key Structural Issues
Dealing first with equity, a number of different layers to the argument may
be usefully distinguished in assessing the fairness of the current system. Where
separate and distinct public and private healthcare systems operate side-by-side
and private health insurance provides cover for the latter, then a likely outcome
is that those with insurance – who are most often on higher incomes – will have
more rapid access to health care. Views may, and do, differ about whether this
is equitable, both within and across societies. However, the role of the state in
subsidising health insurance or private health care, directly or indirectly, adds a
further dimension: some who see differential access as fair if the full cost is being
paid by those “going privately” might question its fairness if the taxpayer is in
effect covering part of the cost. A further, and even more complex, dimension
arises when – as in the Irish case – much of the private care to which those with
insurance gain access is actually being delivered in public hospitals. In that situa-
tion, the financial flows underpinning the system are more difficult to disentangle
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but the two-tier nature of access by those with versus without insurance is more
striking.
So what is distinctive about the Irish case is that the public hospital system has
come to be seen very widely as a two-tier one, offering the better-off more rapid
access; the fact that they are in effect subsidised by the taxpayer in doing so is
less widely debated but well understood by analysts. Subsidisation comes through
tax breaks on insurance premia and below-cost charges for private care in public
hospital; recently this charge has been raised significantly but still represents an
implicit subsidy to private care in public hospitals (Nolan and Wiley (2000)). The
clarity of the distinction between private versus public beds in those hospitals
and how to ensure that private patients do not obtain preferential access through
public beds have also been the focus of particular attention from policy-makers.
Even if private care in public hospitals covered its full cost or even generated
a surplus to cross-subsidise care of public patients, an equity concern would arise
about two-speed access to those hospitals. The main argument advanced for re-
tention of private care in public hospitals is that this allows the most able medical
specialists to be available to care for public patients. There has been no attempt
to assess the scale of the purported benefits to the public system, nor whether of
close interaction with private care are outweighed by the costs.
These costs include not only the direct and indirect subsidisation already men-
tioned, but also the distortionary impact of the incentives for medical consultants
and hospital managers associated with the inter-mingling of public and private
care. Most medical consultants employed to treat public patients, and paid a
salary for doing so, also have private patients for whom they are paid on a fee-
per-service basis. While consultants are committed to a specified number of hours
per week caring for public patients there is no effective monitoring, and the in-
centive they face to concentrate more of their attention on private patients – even
if it is by working very long hours over and above their public commitment –
may clearly be to the detriment of public patients. (Unlike private patients, many
public patients will be treated by more junior doctors). Public hospital managers
also face an incentive to maximise revenue from private patients in any given
year, since this is one of the few sources of additional revenue available to them.
Some of these incentive issues might still feature, though they would probably
be less pronounced, if private care was delivered only in private hospitals – if for
example consultants still had a mix of private and public patients and were in
effect incentivised to prioritise the former. Equity concerns could still be raised
about faster access to such private hospitals, especially if the state subsidises
them not only indirectly by favourable tax treatment of insurance premia and via
training of staff in the public system, but also by direct tax breaks to encourage
building private facilities as have recently been introduced by the Irish govern-
économiepublique
7
panorama Brian Nolan
ment. However, both efficiency and equity concerns are undoubtedly heightened
by Ireland’s peculiarly intimate public-private mix.
4. Insurance, Efficiency and Equity
It will be clear that health insurance underpins private hospital care in Ireland.
The opening up of the market for health insurance has undoubtedly altered the
situation significantly. The fact that the former monopoly insurer VHI, though
still dominating the market, faces real competition from BUPA Ireland and the
potential for entry by more competitors has clearly affected behaviour in the
market. This is most obvious in the range of new insurance products which
continue to appear and the efforts to market them. Despite price competition,
however, the cost of insurance has continued to rise.
The highly regulated nature of the private health insurance market in Ireland
remains distinctive. Open enrolment, community rating and lifetime cover are
enshrined as core principles, reflecting the role which public policy has tradition-
ally assigned to insurance in the health care system. 3 These restrictions have not
been much debated and appear widely supported, although their rationale is open
to question. The logic that applied when public policy saw insurance financing
hospital care for the well-off cannot simply carry over to what is now a very
different situation. Indeed, it is far from clear where policy now sees insurance
fitting in and going, in a situation where everyone is entitled to avail of public
care on the same basis but half chose to buy insurance.
Implementation of the risk equalisation scheme in order to support community
rating, on the other hand, has proved controversial – at least between the two
insurers who would be affected! A vigorous debate between them has continued
as to the justification for such a scheme and the need for a transfer, and no
transfer of funds across insurers has yet taken place. 4 This uncertainty may be
acting as a deterrent to the entry of further insurers to compete in the Irish market.
As well as the supply side, the prospects for the demand for health insurance
are also uncertain. Even if it were to plateau at about the current level, the
dynamic effects of recent growth in the numbers purchasing health insurance
still have to work their way through. It is not clear, from a financial or broader
public policy perspective, whether a 50 %/50 % split between those with and
without insurance, is inherently unstable. From a public policy perspective, it is
hard to see why the number taking out private insurance should in itself be a
3. See Department of Health and Children 1999a, b, Health Insurance Authority (2002).
4. See Health Insurance Authority (2003), BUPA Ireland (2000), Van de Ven (2000).
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target variable. If however public policy gave priority to effectively improving
access to, and quality of, care for public patients in public hospitals this might
have a significant impact on demand for private insurance, given the apparent
importance of perceptions of the public system in promoting that demand.
While health has become an extremely high-profile and politically sensitive
topic, health insurance has not come centre-stage in that debate – which has fo-
cused on waiting times for public hospital care and the location of those hospitals.
There has been some political debate about alternative involving “insurance for
all”, either via social insurance or subsidised private insurance, but this has not
as yet progressed very far. The slogan that “everyone should be a private patient”
amply illustrates that having 50% of the population with insurance alters the con-
text for such a debate. However, it will clearly be difficult to move forward when
“insurance for all” means very different things to those advocating it – and clarity
about who would gain and lose is notably lacking.
5. Conclusions
Almost half the Irish population now pay for private health insurance, one of
the highest levels of coverage in the OECD. This is despite the fact that everyone
has entitlement to public hospital care from the state, and hospital care is what
private health insurance mostly covers. The insured can avail of “private” health
care, although much of this private care is actually delivered in public hospitals.
The resulting two-tier system is now widely regarded as problematic from an
equity perspective, but there are also serious efficiency issues to be faced because
of the incentive structures embedded in this particularly close intertwining of
public and private. The recent introduction of competition in the health insurance
market, in a tightly regulated setting, has led to the introduction of a wider range
of insurance products but does not address these fundamental problems. The Irish
experience shows that a structure designed to take advantage of possible benefits
for the public system of close interaction with private care can create perverse
incentives, be inequitable in terms of access and utilisation. and undermine that
public system. The political economy of reform is however highly problematic.
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